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CLEAR AND CONVINCING CIVILITY:
APPLYING THE CIVIL COMMITMENT
STANDARD OF PROOF TO CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE
STEPHEN J. MOSS ∗
In a time of deep political divisions in nearly every area, civil asset forfeiture is
the rare topic that draws opprobrium from both the right and the left. Civil
libertarians despise an overbearing government stealing private property from
otherwise innocent citizens, and Progressives object to the disproportionate impact
forfeiture has on low-income and minority communities. Scholars have written
much about the constitutionality of civil in rem forfeiture; however, missing from
the discussion is an examination of the low evidentiary burden the government must
hurdle to successfully confiscate private property. Additionally, the similarity
between civil commitment proceedings and civil in rem forfeiture proceedings lends
a comparison that implies the latter requires a higher standard of proof.
This Comment argues that due process demands courts in civil in rem forefeiture
proceedings apply a clear and convincing standard of proof. It does so by using the
Supreme Court’s framework in Mathews v. Eldridge, as applied to civil
commitment in Addington v. Texas, and concludes that only the clear and
convincing standard is constitutionally acceptable. Civil commitment and civil in
rem forfeiture are both quasi-criminal proceedings that run the risk of more than
the mere deprivation of money. Due process requires that these serious deprivations
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occur only after the government satisfies a clear and convincing standard of proof.
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INTRODUCTION
The abuses of civil asset forfeiture are well-known, well-documented,
and well-ridiculed. 1 Indeed, in the modern political climate where
partisans on either side find little to agree about, both the Democratic
Party and the Republican Party unite in criticism of civil asset
forfeiture. 2 Many have convincingly argued that civil asset forfeiture is
an unconstitutional practice; 3 however, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected that argument. 4 In light of the Court’s determination that
civil asset forfeiture is constitutional, this Comment approaches the
discussion with a discrete focus on the standard of proof in civil in rem
forfeiture proceedings. 5 Civil in rem forfeiture is a civil action filed by
the government against property rather than against a specific person. 6
Comparing civil in rem forfeiture to civil commitment, this Comment
1. See, e.g., DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE
ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 2 (2d ed. 2015) (“Civil forfeiture threatens the
constitutional rights of all Americans. Using civil forfeiture, the government can take
your home, business, cash, car or other property on the mere suspicion that it is
somehow connected to criminal activity—and without ever convicting or even
charging you with a crime.”); Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Forfeiture (HBO
television broadcast Oct. 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iRJSWok
FK3s&list=ELIsVgFEe2SK [https://perma.cc/6PT3-V96K] (calling civil forfeiture “even
worse” than “a Gwyneth Paltrow euphemism for divorce” and proposing a satirical new
procedural drama, “Law and Order: Civil Asset Forfeiture Unit,” to highlight the absurdity
of unjust modern civil in rem forfeiture actions against property).
2. See DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMMITTEE, 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 14
(2016) (declaring that the Party would “reform the civil asset forfeiture system to
protect people and remove perverse incentives for law enforcement to ‘police for a
profit’”); REPUBLICAN PARTY, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016 15 (2016) (noting that civil
asset forfeiture “has become a tool for unscrupulous law enforcement officials, acting
without due process, to profit by destroying the livelihood of innocent individuals,
many of whom never recover the lawful assets taken from them” and calling “on
Congress and state legislatures to enact reforms to protect law-abiding citizens against
abusive asset forfeiture tactics”).
3. See, e.g., David Benjamin Ross, Comment, Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction that Offends
Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 276–77 (2000/2001) (arguing that civil forfeiture
is an unconstitutional “practice [that] offends traditional notions of due process”).
4. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974)
(noting the Court’s history of upholding forfeiture statutes as constitutional).
5. See In Rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining in rem as
“[i]nvolving or determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons
generally with respect to that thing”).
6. LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 22 (1996);
see David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 13
NEV. L.J. 1, 5 (2012) (noting that in an in rem proceeding “the property itself is the
defendant”).
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argues that the standard of proof for civil in rem forfeiture proceedings
should be the same clear and convincing evidence standard the
Supreme Court requires in civil commitment proceedings.
Civil commitment and civil asset forfeiture are analogous
proceedings. Both are controversial government actions that allow for
significant deprivations. 7 Both have a long history in England and the
United States. 8 Both have been found constitutional in part because of
their historical origins. 9 Both have expanded beyond a historically limited
practice.10 Both are authorized under state and federal statutes. 11 Both
are civil proceedings with a quasi-criminal element. 12 However, civil
commitment requires the higher evidentiary standard of proof, clear and
convincing evidence, while civil asset forfeiture remains permissible
under the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard. 13
The evidentiary standard of proof is an essential due process
safeguard against erroneous deprivations and is not a mere matter of
semantics. 14 Indeed, a standard of proof is the only thing standing
between an individual and involuntary commitment or forfeiture of his
property. 15 Courts decide what level of proof satisfies due process. 16
Using the Supreme Court’s framework in Mathews v. Eldridge, 17 as
applied to civil commitment in Addington v. Texas, 18 this Comment
argues that due process demands judges in civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings, like those in civil commitment proceedings, apply the
higher clear and convincing standard of proof. 19
Part I provides an overview of civil asset forfeiture, civil commitment, and
standards of proof.20 It identifies and explores contraband, facilitating
property, and proceeds forfeiture and traces the historical expansion of

7. See infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 294–96 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 425 (1979) (noting that a standard
of proof allocates risk between parties and that adopting a new standard is more than
an exercise in semantics).
15. See id.
16. See infra Section I.C.
17. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
18. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part I.
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each.21 It considers civil in rem forfeiture’s evolution to a modern practice
that allows forfeiture of criminal activity proceeds.22 It likewise surveys civil
commitment’s historical origins and evolution. 23 Finally, it explores the
applicable standards of proof by explicitly examining the purpose of
the clear and convincing standard. 24
Part II uses the Mathews factors, as applied to civil commitment in
Addington, to show that the preponderance standard currently used in
civil in rem forfeiture proceedings does not satisfy Fifth Amendment
Due Process requirements. 25 Finally, this Comment concludes that the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard should be applied in all
federal civil in rem forfeiture proceedings. 26
I. BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of federal civil asset forfeiture, civil
commitment, and the clear and convincing evidentiary standard of
proof in the United States. Section I.A. focuses on federal civil asset
forfeiture. Because the Supreme Court justified the constitutionality
of civil forfeiture by relying on the limited historical practice that
existed prior to the Constitution, Section I.A.1. charts the extensive
history of civil asset forfeiture practices from Medieval England to the
modern United States. 27 Section I.A.2. delineates the categories of
property that may be forfeited under federal law, while Section I.A.3.
explains the differences between criminal, administrative, and civil
forfeiture proceedings. 28 Section I.B. expounds civil commitment’s
history and compares it favorably to civil forfeiture’s history. 29 Finally,
Section I.C. provides an overview of standards of proof used in civil
proceedings and focuses on the clear and convincing standard. 30

21. See infra Section I.A.2.
22. See infra Section I.A.1.
23. See infra Section I.B.
24. See infra Section I.C.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Conclusion.
27. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing the denial of certiorari); see infra Section I.A.1.
28. See infra Sections I.A.2, I.A.3.
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. See infra Section I.C.
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A. Federal Civil Asset Forfeiture
Modern civil asset forfeiture proceedings are authorized by statute
and occur at both the state and federal level. Several statutes authorize
federal civil asset forfeiture, 31 but all of them were updated to include
the provisions of the Civil Asset Reform Act of 2000 32 (CAFRA). No
federal common law of forfeiture exists, but rather Congress enacted
a variety of forfeiture provisions over time that resulted in an illogical
body of law. 33 Civil in rem forfeiture requires no underlying criminal
conviction of the property owner or other person linked to the property.34
Instead, the government commences an action against the property
itself, i.e., in rem, based on the idea that the property has been put to
“improper use,” not based on any theory that the person to whom it
belongs was involved in wrongdoing. 35
1.

Historical forfeiture practices
The Supreme Court expressly relied on the longstanding history of
forfeiture practices to justify the constitutionality of modern civil asset
forfeiture. 36 However, an examination of the historical practice in
relation to the modern one exposes the deficiencies of relying on a
historical rationale to justify a radically expansive modern practice. 37
Forfeiture practices and laws in Medieval England, Colonial America, and
the United States pre-1970 allowed only for contraband and facilitating

31. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5317(c), 5332 (2012) (authorizing forfeiture in bulk cash
smuggling and currency reporting instances).
32. Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000).
33. STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 1–3, at 4
(2d ed. 2013) (arguing there is “almost no rhyme or reason” to current forfeiture law).
34. Id. § 1–5, at 18.
35. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). But see New Mexico v. Nunez, 2 P.3d 264, 284–85
(N.M. 1999) (noting that in “modern jurisprudence . . . [a]n in rem action is directed, not
against the property per se, but rather at resolving the interests, claims, titles, and rights in
that property. And it is persons . . . who possess those interests, claims, titles, and rights”).
36. See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that “[t]he Court has justified its unique constitutional treatment of civil
forfeiture largely by reference to a discrete historical practice that existed at the time
of the founding”).
37. See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)
(finding that civil forfeiture is “too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced”); see also Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 849
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that he is “skeptical that th[e] historical practice is
capable of sustaining, as a constitutional matter, the contours of modern practice”).
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property forfeiture.38 However, in the modern civil asset forfeiture context,
proceeds forfeiture is now more common than facilitating property
forfeiture. 39 This section traces the practice’s history with a focus on the
ways in which the practice has expanded over time.
a. Guilty property: forfeiture from the Bible to the Middle Ages
Asset forfeiture, like many American legal practices, traces its origins
to the English common law; however, there is some debate whether
the practice may be even older. 40 Some scholars identify the genesis of
forfeiture in this Old Testament passage, “[i]f an ox gore a man or a
woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall
not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit.”41 Under Mosaic law,
this biblical passage justified removing the animal from its owner, killing
the animal, and disposing of the meat without eating it.42 This biblical
concept was likely the origin of the English common law “deodand,”43 a
legal doctrine that allowed the monarch to seize personal chattel that was
“the immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature.”44
Originally, the deodand was paid to the Church as atonement “for
the souls of such as were snatched away by sudden death.” 45 However,
as the deodand concept progressed through the Middle Ages, the State
38. See discussion infra Section I.A.1.b.
39. See CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 26–1, at 937 (noting that facilitating property
forfeiture is an older concept than proceeds forfeiture and “prior to the 1970s, most
forfeitures were limited to the property used to commit a criminal offense”).
40. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–81 (1974)
(holding that asset forfeiture is constitutional in part because of the “historical
background of forfeiture statutes in this country,” which are “traceable” to both the
English common law “deodand” and to “Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices”).
But see LEVY, supra note 6, at 8–9, 20 (arguing that the deodand from English common
law is the “basis of civil forfeiture in America today” but that it is not derived from the
Mosaic law); Adam Crepelle, Probable Cause to Plunder: Civil Asset Forfeiture and the
Problems it Creates, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 315, 318 (2017) (arguing that deodand
is not “the progenitor of modern American civil asset forfeiture,” but that the “English
Navigation Acts are the most direct antecedent of U.S. civil asset forfeiture law”).
41. Exodus 21:28 (King James); see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.17 (citing
the passage from Exodus as an origin for English common law forfeiture).
42. See Exodus, supra note 41.
43. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16 (noting that deodand was derived “from
the Latin Deo dandum, [meaning] ‘to be given to God’”); Deodand, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 5 (defining deodand as “[s]omething (such as an animal) that
has done wrong and must therefore be forfeited to the Crown”).
44. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *300 (Wayne
Morrison ed., Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 2001) (1765–1769).
45. Id.
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personified in the monarch became the forfeited property beneficiary,
rather than the Church. 46 Likewise, the innocence of the property
owner became “an irrelevant consideration” to whether the property
was forfeitable. 47 The guilty property facilitated the crime and was
consequently forfeitable regardless of the owner’s culpability. 48
While the deodand concept was limited to “guilty property,” English
common law also allowed for forfeiture when one was convicted of a
felony or treason. 49 The individual’s criminal conviction required the
confiscation of his “moveables [sic] or personal estate” and the vesting
of rights to the property “in the king, who [was] the person supposed to
be offended” by the criminal act. 50 The criminal act itself, not the nature
of the property, demanded the complete forfeiture of all property. 51
Aside from this criminal forfeiture proceeding, early English common law
allowed for the forfeiture of facilitating property or contraband but not
proceeds of any criminal acts. 52
b. Customs, rebellion, and booze: statutory forfeiture in the early
modern period
In the advent of seafaring exploration, England instituted a statutory
forfeiture practice that bears a stronger resemblance to the modern
American practice than the Medieval deodand concept. 53 Under the
Navigation Acts of 1660, 54 a single crewman’s misconduct could cause

46. LEVY, supra note 6, at 11 (“As societies became more developed, the notion
emerged that the guilty object required community atonement by providing compensation
to someone in charge, like a chieftain or king. He was the one responsible for keeping
the peace that had been shattered by the homicide, even if it was accidental. He was
therefore the one who should benefit from the sacrifice.”).
47. Id. at 10.
48. See Pimentel, supra note 6, at 8; see also discussion of facilitating property infra
Section I.A.2.
49. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) (noting that “[t]hree kinds
of forfeiture were established in England . . . deodand, forfeiture upon conviction for
a felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *299; see
also discussion infra Section I.A.3.
50. BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *299.
51. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682–83 (1974)
(noting that unlike English law, American law never permitted “forfeiture of estates as
a consequence of a federal criminal conviction”).
52. See supra Section I.A.2.
53. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 612–13 (explaining that the United States adopted statutory
forfeiture laws similar to those in England); Crepelle, supra note 40, at 318–19.
54. 12 Car. II. c. 18 (Eng.).
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the forfeiture of an entire ship.55 The English government’s enforcement
of the Navigation Acts and similar laws in the colonies allowed for the
forfeiture of vessels and commodities used in violation of those laws.56
Under the Navigation Acts, the Crown brought an in rem action against a
ship, as facilitating property, without regard to the owner’s innocence or
guilt.57 Prosecution occurred in common law courts, as well as viceadmiralty courts without juries.58 American jurisprudence from the early
Republic to the twentieth century reaffirmed the permissibility of
forfeiture of property that was itself guilty of facilitating criminal activity.59
Contraband and facilitating property remained the exclusive categories
of property that could be forfeited until the late twentieth century. 60
In the early Republic, statutory in rem forfeiture actions continued
in admiralty courts and focused primarily on customs and maritime
issues. 61 Indeed, the first Congress enacted legislation allowing for
55. Crepelle, supra note 40, at 318. Compare Mitchell v. Torup (1766) 145 Eng.
Rep. 764, 764, 766; Parker 227, 232–33 (finding permissible the forfeiture of a ship
that illegally imported 221 pounds of tea into England unbeknownst to the owner
because any requirement that an owner have actual knowledge would have “opened a
door for perpetual evasion, and the provisions of this excellent act for the increase of
the navigation would have been defeated”), with Jeremy Roebuck, Challenge to Phila.
Civil Forfeiture Law Continues, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.
philly.com/philly/news/local/20141219_Challenge_to_Philadelphia_s_civilforfeiture_law_continues.html [https://VG52-ZAT3] (documenting a case in Philadelphia
where the owners of $350,000 home were subjected to a civil forfeiture proceeding because
their twenty-two-year-old son sold “less than $40 of heroin outside” the home).
56. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
57. Id.; see LEVY, supra note 6, at 43 (explaining that “[a] vessel whose guilt was
suspected would be arrested and prosecuted by name” because “[t]he law treated the
ship as if it were alive [and] a guilty person”).
58. See C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 140–41 (1943) (noting that colonial
common law courts maintained jurisdiction over in rem forfeiture proceedings;
however, vice-admiralty courts were used more frequently “prompted in part by the
Crown’s desire to have access to a forum not controlled by the obstinate resistance of
American juries”).
59. See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)
(holding that the forfeiture of an automobile used “for the deposit and concealment
of . . . distilled spirits upon which a tax was imposed by the United States and had not
been paid” was acceptable even though the owner was innocent because “the thing is
primarily considered the offender”); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 13–14 (1827)
(holding a proceeding against a forfeited Spanish brig engaged in piracy was a
permissible in rem action in which “the offence [sic] is attached primarily to the
thing”).
60. See supra Section I.A.2.
61. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 12–13 (affirming that in rem
forfeitures in Admiralty were civil proceedings and it was sufficient “for forfeitures . . .
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forfeiture of ships and goods involved in customs violations. 62 Early
American statutes and case law continued to advance the notion that
the property itself was guilty; however, courts increasingly applied a
negligence rationale to imply that the property owner was negligent in
allowing illegal use of his property. 63 The negligence rationale allowed
courts and policymakers to justify property forfeiture that would
otherwise seem unjust. 64 If a court found that an otherwise innocent
owner was negligent in allowing his property to be used for illegal
purposes, it helped justify the loss of property when the owner had no
actual knowledge of the property’s illegal use. 65
During the Civil War, Congress enacted the Confiscation Act of
1862 66 with the explicit purpose to “suppress Insurrection, to punish
Treason and Rebellion, [and] to seize and confiscate the Property of
Rebels.” 67 Congress declared that the Act’s goal was “to insure [sic]
the speedy termination of the . . . rebellion” by making it “the duty of
the President of the United States to cause the seizure of all the estate
and property, money, stocks, credits, and effects” from all those who
actively participated in the Confederate Government or those who
gave “aid and comfort to [the] rebellion.” 68 Any judicial proceedings
conducted under the Act were instituted in rem and had to adhere to
the procedures set forth in admiralty or revenue proceedings. 69
The punitive Confiscation Act represented a watershed in forfeiture
jurisprudence because for the first time, Congress applied forfeiture
principles, previously limited to admiralty or customs cases, to all property

to allege the offence [sic] in the terms of the statute creating the forfeitures”); United
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796) (holding that a seizure of a
French privateer was rightfully decided in an Admiralty court because it was “a civil
cause . . . in rem; and [did] not, in any degree, touch the person of the offender”).
62. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993).
63. Id. at 616.
64. See, e.g., supra note 55.
65. See supra note 55.
66. Confiscation Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 5.
69. Id. § 7. Compare LEVY, supra note 6, at 53 (“Forfeiture had nothing to do with
conviction for treason or even rebellion. As a matter of fact the in rem proceedings,
which the statute authorized, were not even aimed at the property of traitors; the
forfeiture sections referred rather to the property of ‘persons in armed rebellion, or
abetting it.’”), with Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611–12 (1993) (noting that English
common law forfeiture “obviously served to punish felons and traitors” but was allowed only
upon conviction “of a felony or of treason”), and supra text accompanying notes 49–51.
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with an explicitly punitive intention.70 The Supreme Court initially
upheld the Confiscation Act as constitutional, but did not explicitly
endorse the new expansive application of forfeiture proceedings. 71 Seven
years later, in Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States, 72 the Court relied on
traditional admiralty in rem proceedings against ships as precedent and
unanimously held that land leased to a distiller who failed to pay taxes
and kept false books should be forfeited even though the landowner
did not actually know that his distillery had been used for fraudulent
purposes. 73 The offense attached to the distillery “and the real and
personal property used in connection with” it, even though the
landowner knew nothing of the distiller’s criminal acts. 74
Throughout Prohibition, the Federal Government, with the Supreme
Court’s acquiescence, expanded civil forfeiture’s reach to include
property used in bootlegging and the illegal transport of alcohol. 75
Increasingly, the Court justified the confiscation of facilitating property—
“the instrument by which the offense was committed”—in the broader
context of federal law enforcement and public policy objectives.76
However, forfeiture cases during the Prohibition period were still more
closely related to the early admiralty forfeiture cases than they were to
modern forfeiture actions because the “Government’s right to take
possession of property stemmed from the misuse of the property itself;”
forfeitable property was still limited to contraband and facilitating
property, but not proceeds.77 Until 1970, the Government prosecuted
guilty facilitating property in a variety of contexts, and the Court
repeatedly upheld those forfeiture actions as constitutional. 78
70. See LEVY, supra note 6, at 57 (finding that “[i]n rem forfeiture proceedings
became common after the Civil War”).
71. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 306 (1870) (holding that the
Confiscation Act of 1862 was constitutional because “Congress had then full power to
provide for the seizure and confiscation of any property which the enemy or adherents of
the enemy could use for the purpose of maintaining the war against the government”).
72. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
73. Id. at 402; LEVY, supra note 6, at 57–58.
74. Dobbins’s Distillery, 96 U.S. at 402, 404.
75. See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 466–69 (1926) (permitting the forfeiture
of an automobile used “for the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor” even though the
owner of the automobile had no knowledge of the illegal use of the automobile).
76. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 2–3, at 32.
77. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 121 (1993); see supra Section
I.A.2.
78. See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)
(holding that forfeiture of an automobile to which the dealer retained title was
constitutional because the automobile itself was guilty of being used for bootlegging).

2268

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:101

The Supreme Court’s repeated use of a negligence rationale to
justify what would otherwise seem an unjust procedure implicated a
punitive purpose in the civil forfeiture action that the Court had
difficulty reconciling with the civil label. 79 For instance, in Boyd v.
United States, 80 the Court concluded that an in rem forfeiture action was
criminal in nature and entitled to protection under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. 81 The Court later explained
that the forfeiture in Boyd was “a penalty that had absolutely no
correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing
the law,” and that the forfeiture proceeding could “prejudice [the
property owner] in respect to later criminal proceedings.”82 The quasicriminal forfeiture proceeding in Boyd evidenced a “countervailing
punitive purpose or effect” even though the legislative purpose was civil
in nature. 83 Ten years after Boyd, in United States v. Zucker, 84 the Court
found paradoxically that civil forfeiture was not “technically criminal” and
thus the Sixth Amendment did not apply.85 In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania,86 the Court clarified that civil forfeiture is a civil action, in fact,
but nevertheless, the proceeding has a quasi-criminal character.87 The
Court reasoned that the purpose of a statute allowing the forfeiture of an
automobile transporting contraband liquor was to penalize violations of the
law.88 The government charged the automobile owner with a criminal
offense but also intended that the forfeiture action penalized the owner.89
Like their English forbearers, early American statutes and case law
authorized civil forfeiture of contraband and facilitating property in
79. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993) (noting that civil in rem
“forfeiture has been justified on two theories—that the property itself is ‘guilty’ of the
offense, and that the owner may be held accountable for the wrongs of others to whom
he entrusts his property. Both theories rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner
has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly
punished for that negligence”).
80. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
81. Id. at 633–34.
82. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 244, 254 (1980) (comparing “the assessment
of a ‘civil penalty’ under . . . the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWCPA)” with
civil forfeiture to determine whether the FWCPA penalty is a “criminal case” and
entitled to protections under the Fifth Amendment).
83. Id.
84. 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
85. Id. at 481.
86. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id.
89. See id.
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the maritime and customs context. 90 During and following the Civil
War, Congress expanded civil forfeiture to include contraband and
property facilitating rebellion, bootlegging, and other federal crimes.91
During this same period, the Supreme Court continued to justify civil
forfeiture under a guilty property justification, but the Court’s rationale
increasingly focused on a theory of owner negligence.92 Advancement of
this negligence theory introduced a punitive aspect to civil forfeiture that
required the Court to grapple with whether civil forfeiture was a de facto
criminal proceeding.93 The Court settled on the term “quasi-criminal” to
describe civil forfeiture proceedings, and that appellation has applied since.94
c. The war on organized crime, drugs, and terror: expansion of
forfeiture to proceeds of criminality
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 95 marked the beginning of a
“rediscovery of criminal forfeiture” that allowed the government to forfeit
proceeds of organized crime and white-collar crime. 96 Similarly, the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 97
amended in 1978, allowed the forfeiture of proceeds from drug
activity. 98 By the mid-1990s, federal civil forfeiture statutes applied to
contraband, facilitating property, and proceeds for “virtually all serious
offenses, including money laundering, car-jacking, espionage, child
pornography, bank fraud, and most other ‘white collar’ crimes.” 99

90. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text.
94. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
95. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2012)).
96. LEVY, supra note 6, at 61–62; see also United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,
507 U.S. 111, 121 n.16 (1993); Pimentel, supra note 6, at 11 (stating that RICO is “the
provenance of proceeds forfeitures” and that proceeds “is independent and unrelated”
to the other types of forfeiture).
97. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
(2012)).
98. See 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. at 121–22 (explaining that before the 1978
amendment, Congress had authorized only the forfeiture of “the illegal substances
themselves and the instruments by which they were manufactured and distributed”);
CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 2–4, at 33 (noting that forfeiture of criminal proceeds under
the 1978 amendment was an entirely new idea).
99. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 2–4, at 34.
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The expansion of civil forfeiture caused a similar increase in
Supreme Court rulings on the topic. 100 The Court explicitly disavowed
the concept of guilty property and acknowledged that the legal fiction was
not necessary to conduct in rem proceedings against property.101 Some
commentators have opined that the Supreme Court’s rulings in the 1990s
do not represent a “structure and logic” or “an unfolding plan,” but are
more akin to the Court “making it up as they went along.”102 During the
decade, the Court ruled on the following important forfeiture issues,
many of which were eventually codified in the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA): the Due Process Clause and innocent
ownership of forfeited property;103 the Due Process Clause and the right
to notice and a hearing before forfeiting property;104 the application of

100. See id. § 2–1, at 28.
Asset forfeiture came into prominence as a law enforcement tool in the United
States during the 1990s. At the beginning of that decade, the Department of
Justice . . . was forfeiting approximately $200 million per year in criminal
assets, mostly from drug cases. By the end of the decade, it was forfeiting more
than $600 million per year in assets involved in an enormous variety of serious
crimes.
Id.
101. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 295 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that the Court is not reviving the fiction “that the property is punished as if it
were a sentient being capable of moral choice”); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
616 (1993) (explaining that the Court understood the guilty property fiction “to rest
on the notion that the owner . . . [is] negligent” because he allowed his property to
become involved in a crime).
102. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 2–5, at 37 (quoting JOSEPH ELLIS, FOUNDING
BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 216 (2000)).
103. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (holding that in rem forfeiture
of an automobile owned by an innocent owner that nonetheless “facilitated and was
used in criminal activity” was not a violation of the innocent owner’s right to due
process under the Fifth Amendment). But see Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202, 206 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)
(2012)) (“An innocent owner’s interest in property shall not be forfeited under any
civil forfeiture statute. The claimant shall have the burden of proving that the claimant
is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
104. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993)
(holding that “[u]nless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause
requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture”); see also Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (“The Government shall initiate a civil
forfeiture action against real property by—(A) filing a complaint for forfeiture; (B)
posting a notice of the complaint on the property; and (C) serving notice on the
property owner, along with a copy of the complaint.”).
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the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines clause to forfeiture actions; 105
and the application of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause
to forfeiture actions. 106
In 2000, Congress responded in a bipartisan fashion to the “inadequate
protections for private property” provided in statute or by the courts and
passed the first comprehensive overhaul of federal civil asset forfeiture laws,
CAFRA.107 Notably, CAFRA applies to all federal civil forfeiture proceedings
and “requires the Government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

105. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 336 (1998) (applying the
Court’s ruling in Austin, but also establishing a “gross disproportionality” test that
renders forfeiture unconstitutionally excessive when the amount of the forfeiture “is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense”); Austin, 509 U.S. at
610, 618, 621–22 (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applies to civil in rem forfeiture and reasoning that the issue is not “whether
forfeiture . . . is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment,” and since
forfeiture in rem was historically understood as punishment that did not “serve[] solely
a remedial purpose,” it is subject to the Eighth Amendment); see also Timbs v. Indiana,
139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 983(g) (codifying the Court’s grossproportionality test: “(1) The claimant under subsection (a)(4) may petition the court
to determine whether the forfeiture was constitutionally excessive. (2) In making this
determination, the court shall compare the forfeiture to the gravity of the offense
giving rise to the forfeiture”).
106. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 278, 288, 291–92 (holding that “in rem civil forfeitures are
neither ‘punishment’ nor criminal for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause”
because civil forfeitures are remedial civil sanctions that are distinct from punitive in
personam civil penalties such as a fine, and establishing a two-part test to determine
when the provision constitutes punishment).
107. 146 CONG. REC. 3654 (2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see 146 CONG. REC.
5227–28 (statement of Rep. Hyde) (stating that CAFRA “represents the culmination
of a 7-year effort to reform our Nation’s civil asset forfeiture laws” that will return “civil
asset forfeiture to the ranks of respected law enforcement tools that can be used
without risk to the civil liberties and property rights of American citizens”). But see
Jennifer Levesque, Note, Property Rights—When Reform is not Enough: A Look Inside the
Problems Created by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 37 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 59,
59 (2015) (arguing that “ongoing abuses of civil forfeiture . . . have continued to
plague innocent property owners . . . years after enactment of the Act”); Daniel Reed,
Note, The Next Step in Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform: Passing the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act of 2014, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 933, 934–35 (2017) (arguing in favor of CAFRA 2014,
a proposed reform bill that has yet to get a vote, because CAFRA 2000 “did not do
enough to protect citizens from civil forfeiture abuse” specifically because the
“preponderance of the evidence standard . . . is an inappropriately light standard for
the government to prove”).
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that the property is subject to forfeiture.”108 CAFRA raised the standard from
the previous statutory requirement that the government only needed to
“make an initial showing of probable cause that the property [was] subject to
civil forfeiture.”109 To prevail in a forfeiture proceeding, CAFRA shifted the
burden of proof to the government instead of requiring, as before that the
owner establish the property’s innocence.110 CAFRA proponents argued
that the preponderance standard provided insufficient protection for the
interests of property owners.111 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of the standard of proof for civil asset forfeiture.112 Indeed,
as recently as the October 2018 term, a unanimous Supreme Court took for
granted that civil in rem forfeiture is constitutional and instead focused on the
applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the state practice.113
2.

Categories of property subject to forfeiture
Three categories of property that may be forfeited under federal law today.
In Bennis v. Michigan,114 the Supreme Court considered whether a state must
allow a forfeited property owner to contest the forfeiture by arguing the

108. 146 CONG. REC. 5228 (statement of Rep. Hyde). Cf. United States v. Twenty
One Thousand Dollars in United States Postal Money Orders, 298 F. Supp. 2d 597, 601
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (stating that the Government can meet its preponderance burden without
demonstrating “a direct connection between Defendant property and the illegal activity”).
109. 146 CONG. REC. 5228 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
110. Id.; cf. infra text accompanying notes 157–60 (discussing the current burden of
proof under CAFRA as well as additional protections for property owners).
111. 146 CONG. REC. 3665 (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also CASSELLA, supra note
33, § 1–5(a)(1) at 18 (noting that the advantage of civil forfeiture is the lower burden of
proof that only requires the Government “to prove the forfeitability of the property by a
preponderance of the evidence”). But see Reed, supra note 107, at 944 (arguing that the
“preponderance of the evidence standard is too easy for overzealous prosecutors to abuse,
and does not create enough of a safeguard against frivolous forfeiture actions”).
112. See, e.g., Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(reasoning “that the Due Process Clause required the State to carry its burden by clear
and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence”); cf. Timbs
v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019) (focusing only on the question of whether the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated to the states under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
113. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686; cf. Damon Root, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear
Significant New Case About Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Bill of Rights, REASON (June
18, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://reason.com/blog/2018/06/18/supreme-courtagrees-to-hear-significant [https://perma.cc/8TG-87FF] (noting that the case could
give the Court “an opportunity to consider the broader injustices that occur in the
name of civil asset forfeiture”).
114. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
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owner’s innocence.115 In a dissent from the majority opinion, Justice Stevens
divided property into three categories useful for understanding civil
forfeiture: contraband, proceeds, and instrumentalities.116
The first category, contraband, is the least controversial of the three
types of forfeited property. 117 In a civil action against contraband, the
government has a public policy interest in preventing private possession
of the object.118 Owning the object in question is illegal, thus government
can assume that it is forfeitable.119 The government has a strong and
obvious interest in seizing contraband to remove the item from public
use. 120 There is little debate that the government has a legitimate
objective in the removal or destruction of contraband, and that the
contraband owner has no legitimate property right in that contraband.121
While some may dispute whether a substance should be considered
contraband, few would dispute the legitimacy of the government’s
interest in removing contraband from the streets.122
Justice Stevens’s second forfeitable category contains the proceeds
of an illegal activity. 123 Under federal law, forfeiture is statutorily
permissible for “the proceeds of more than 200 different state and federal
crimes.” 124 Proceeds means “any property, real or personal, tangible or
115. Id. at 453 (holding that the innocence of a partial owner of an automobile used
to facilitate prostitution did not render civil forfeiture of the automobile
impermissible).
116. Id. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Pimentel, supra note 6, at 3, 6
(arguing that the “policy basis for federal forfeitures” must recognize Justice Stevens’s
three categories and tailor procedures to each type based on its historical practice and
policy basis).
117. Pimentel, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that contraband forfeiture is also
“perhaps [the] least interesting” of the three types of property forfeitures).
118. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)
(contrasting forfeiture of “objects the possession of which, without more, constitutes a
crime” with an automobile used to transport bootleg liquor and noting that “[t]here
is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile”).
119. Pimentel, supra note 6, at 12.
120. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “adulterated food,
sawed-off shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods” are examples of contraband); see
21 U.S.C. § 881(f) (2012) (“All controlled substances in schedule I or II . . . ; all
dangerous, toxic, or hazardous raw materials or products . . . shall be deemed
contraband and seized and summarily forfeited to the United States.”).
121. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–3, at 5 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) is
the most expansive forfeiture statute, and it allows proceeds forfeiture of the following
federal crimes: “fraud, bribery, embezzlement and theft, and scores of more obscure
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intangible, that the wrongdoer would not have obtained or retained but
for the [commission of a] crime.” 125 Proceeds statutes are “powerful” law
enforcement tools that encompass many types of property not
traditionally considered forfeitable and are theoretically limited in
scope to only proceeds tainted by illegal activity. 126 In a civil forfeiture
action against proceeds, the government must only prove that
possession of the property was derived from the commission of a
crime. 127 The forfeiture of proceeds is a relatively modern invention,
meant to deprive criminal enterprises such as the mafia or drug cartels
of the funding necessary to continue their illegal activity. 128
Finally, in the third category, Justice Stevens identified the forfeiture
of instrumentalities; however, this Comment will identify this category by
the more general term, “facilitating property.”129 Facilitating property is
defined broadly to include “any property that makes the prohibited
conduct ‘less difficult or more or less free from obstruction or
hindrance.’”130 In federal statutes, the use of the phrase “any property used
to facilitate such an offense” denotes the permissibility of the forfeiture of
facilitating property.131 Both England and the United States historically have
permitted facilitating property forfeiture, unlike proceeds forfeiture.132

ones,” while the “state crimes include murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, obscenity, and state drug trafficking”).
125. Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v. Farkas, 474 F. App’x 349, 359–
60 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that the district court correctly applied “the ‘but for’ nexus
test first articulated by the Seventh Circuit” to find that Farkas should forfeit nearly
thirty-nine million dollars “of the property constituting or derived from proceeds he
obtained directly or indirectly as a result” of a mortgage lending fraud scheme).
126. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–3, at 6.
127. Id. § 2–4, at 35.
128. See Pimentel, supra note 6, at 11; infra Section I.A.3.
129. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 460 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
Pimentel, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that instrumentalities is a different, more narrow
characterization of the larger facilitating property category); see also CASSELLA, supra
note 33, § 26–1 at 938 (stating that there is a distinction between the terms “facilitating
property” and “instrumentality,” but that the distinction “has little practical
significance in most cases”).
130. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 26–3, at 942 (quoting United States v. Schifferli, 895
F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990)).
131. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012) (enabling forfeiture of “[a]ny property, real or
personal, within the jurisdiction of the United States, constituting, derived from, or
traceable to, any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from an offense against a
foreign nation, or any property used to facilitate such an offense”).
132. See supra Section I.A.1.
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3.

Types of forfeiture proceedings
This Comment limits its discussion to federal civil in rem forfeiture,133
but there are two additional types of asset forfeiture allowed under federal
law: criminal forfeiture and administrative forfeiture. 134 Criminal
forfeiture is a post-conviction proceeding that is “part of a sentence in a
criminal case” and is an in personam action rather than an in rem action
against the property itself. 135 An in personam action occurs in a standard
criminal or civil case; either the government charges an individual with
a crime or one individual sues another individual. 136 In either instance,
an individual is the object of the legal action, which means it is an in
personam proceeding. 137 The criminal forfeiture proceeding occurs after
the property owner has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
an underlying crime.138 During the sentencing phase, following a
conviction, the government must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property was used in the commission of a crime or that it
constituted the proceeds of illegal activity.139 The Supreme Court held that
criminal forfeiture actions using a lesser burden of proof are constitutional
in part because the government already proved the individual’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.140 The lesser preponderance standard satisfies
due process in criminal forfeiture proceedings because the underlying
conviction protects against an erroneous deprivation.141

133. The argument in favor of a higher standard of proof in civil forfeiture actions
could also logically extend to criminal forfeiture proceedings; however, this Comment
limits its discussion to civil in rem forfeiture because it is the forfeiture proceeding most
prone to erroneous deprivation and abuse. The underlying criminal conviction in
criminal forfeiture proceedings adds a heightened evidentiary standard not present in
civil forfeiture.
134. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4, at 9.
135. Id. § 1–4, at 11.
136. See In Personam, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5 (defining in personam as
“[i]nvolving or determining the personal rights and obligations of the parties”).
137. See CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4, at 11–12.
138. Id. § 15–3, at 570.
139. Id.
140. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995) (rejecting the argument
that criminal in personam forfeiture falls “within the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional
protection” because forfeiture is “an aspect of sentencing”); see also CASSELLA, supra
note 33, § 18–5, at 663–68. But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
(holding that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
141. See infra Section II.A.
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Administrative forfeiture is the default first-step proceeding in most
federal civil forfeiture actions.142 It occurs “without any judicial involvement”
when a federal law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that
property is statutorily forfeitable and the agency sends proper notice to the
property’s owner of its intent to forfeit the property.143 Most forfeiture
statutes either expressly allow for administrative forfeiture or incorporate
the Tariff Act of 1930,144 which allows for administrative forfeiture.145 The
federal agency must “notify parties with an interest in the seized property
of its intent to forfeit the goods administratively,” which allows the owner
or interested parties an opportunity to contest the forfeiture and force the
agency to commence a civil in rem action.146 If an individual contests the
administrative forfeiture, the matter becomes a civil forfeiture proceeding
adjudicated in federal court.147 The majority of asset forfeiture cases
originate from administrative forfeiture actions initiated by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).148 The DEA, or other federal
agencies, “may administratively forfeit goods valued at or less than
$500,000” under the customs laws, subject to the modifications under
CAFRA.149 An administrative forfeiture has the same legal effect as a final
order in a judicial proceeding.150 Administrative forfeiture is subject to
only the probable cause standard of proof unless contested, and then
the civil forfeiture preponderance of the evidence standard applies. 151
Federal civil forfeiture occurs after an individual challenge to the
administrative forfeiture or when the Government files a separate civil
in rem action against property. 152 Since the Supreme Court abandoned
142. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 4–1, at 150.
143. Id.
144. Pub. L. No. 71–361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602–
1621 (2012)) (generally referred to as the Customs laws).
145. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 4–3, at 153.
146. Malladi Drugs & Pharm., Ltd. v. Tandy, 552 F.3d 885, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(explaining the process of a DEA administrative forfeiture proceeding against chemicals
illegally imported from India); see CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4(a), at 10–11; infra text
accompanying notes 152–60.
147. See Pimentel, supra note 6, at 7.
148. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 4–1, at 150 & n.2.
149. Malladi Drugs, 552 F.3d at 887; see also CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 4–3, at 153
(explaining that administrative forfeitures are only authorized by statutes incorporating
or cross-referencing the Customs laws (19 U.S.C. § 1602–1621)).
150. Malladi Drugs, 552 F.3d at 887.
151. Infra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
152. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4(a), at 11, § 1–4(c), at 14 (noting that “civil
forfeiture does not depend on a criminal conviction, the forfeiture action may be filed
before indictment, after indictment, or if there is no indictment at all”).
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the fiction of guilty property, the in rem nature of the proceeding is
now “simply a procedural convenience”; however, it is a convenience
with exceedingly inconvenient results. 153 The steps in a civil forfeiture
action are no different than any other civil case. 154 The government
files a complaint against the property, and a party with an interest in
the property must file an answer to the complaint. 155 Since the CAFRA
reforms, the Government bears the burden at trial of proving property
forfeitable by a preponderance of the evidence. 156 To show that the
property is forfeitable, the Government must establish a nexus between
the property and the alleged crime. 157 Additionally, to protect against
erroneous deprivation, civil forfeiture proceedings, unlike regular civil
proceedings, provide a statutory innocent owner defense.158 The innocent
owner defense allows the property owner or claimant to prove his
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.159 If the government meets
its burden and the owner fails to prove his innocence, the title of the
property passes to the United States.160
B. Civil Commitment: A History Parallel to Civil Asset Forfeiture
Like civil forfeiture, civil commitment has Medieval origins and
originally empowered the monarch to act on behalf of, and in the best
interest of, his or her subjects. 161 The parens patriae doctrine provides
the first historical justification for civil commitment. 162 Under a claim
153. Id. § 1–4(c), at 15; see supra Section I.A.1.
154. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4(c), at 16.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 463–64 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there was no nexus to support the forfeiture because the car seized for
facilitating prostitution “was used as little more than an enclosure for a one-time event”).
157. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4(c), at 16.
158. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012) (“An innocent owner’s interest in property
shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute.”).
159. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4(c), at 16; see 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (“The
claimant shall have the burden of proving that the claimant is an innocent owner by a
preponderance of the evidence.”).
160. CASSELLA, supra note 33, § 1–4, at 17.
161. JUDITH LYNN FAILER, WHO QUALIFIES FOR RIGHTS? HOMELESSNESS, MENTAL
ILLNESS, AND CIVIL COMMITMENT 68–69 (2002); see Mara Lynn Krongard, Comment, A
Population at Risk: Civil Commitment of Substance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 111, 117–18 (2002) (describing the ancient and Medieval civil commitment
practices employed to care for the mentally ill).
162. See Parens Patrie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5 (defining parens patriae,
Latin for “parent of his or her country,” as actions taken by “the state in its capacity as
provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves”).
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of parens patriae, the English monarch could declare someone a “lunatic”
and “provide for the custody and sustenation [sic] of” that person by
taking the person’s “lands and the profits of them” to pay for his
commitment. 163 Like the deodand, parens patriae enabled the “King in
his capacity as ‘father of the country’ . . . [to act] as guardian of persons
under legal disabilities” who were unable to act for themselves.164 In the
United States, the Federal and state governments retain the parens patriae
power.165 The exercise of the state’s police power provides the second
historical justification for civil commitment.166 The common law has long
recognized the sovereign’s authority to commit the mentally ill to
preserve public health and safety.167
From 1874 to 1882, Congress employed these two doctrines to justify
establishing a civil commitment program whereby the government
could hold a convicted prisoner in a federal mental institution during
the term of the prisoner’s incarceration. 168 In the late-1940s, Congress
expanded the previously-limited incarceration in a mental institution
to allow for the continued incarceration of “insane criminals upon the
expiration of their terms of confinement.” 169 In the 1984 Insanity
Defense Reform Act, 170 Congress again changed the standard to allow
for “civil commitment if . . . the prisoner’s ‘release would create a
163. BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *304; see FAILER, supra note 161, at 68–69
(confirming that the first ground for historic civil commitment, parens patriae, in
“Anglo-American law . . . derives from the Prerogativa Regis, an English statute passed
in the latter half of the thirteenth century”).
164. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); see supra text
accompanying notes 46–47 (comparing favorably the Medieval origins of civil asset
forfeiture (deodand) with the concept of the benevolent monarch who cares for the
mentally ill by confiscating their property and hospitalizing them (parens patriae)).
165. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (holding that the parens patriae power is a “beneficent function”
of the Federal Government that is “often necessary to be exercised in the interests of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves”).
166. FAILER, supra note 161, at 68.
167. Id. at 70 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905)).
168. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 138 (2010); see Act of Aug. 7, 1882,
ch. 433, 22 Stat. 302, 330 (1882); Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 465, 18 Stat. 251 (1874)
(expanding the scope of involuntary commitment from those who were “insane” at the
time of commitment to include those who “during the term of their imprisonment,
have or shall become and be insane”).
169. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 139; see 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (1952) (providing a mechanism
to transfer to the Attorney General’s custody any mentally ill prisoner whose
incarceration will soon end after a judicial hearing confirms the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons’s view that the mentally ill prisoner still poses a danger to society).
170. Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–47 (2012)).
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substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage
to the property of another.’” 171 Like the history of civil asset forfeiture,
civil commitment expanded beyond its historically-limited purpose at the
time of America’s founding and at English common law.172 Yet, even
though the modern practice bears little resemblance to the historical one,
the Supreme Court has held modern civil commitment constitutional by
favorably comparing the modern practice to the historical one.173
Finally, in 2006, Congress expanded civil commitment to include
those “persons who, due to mental illness, are sexually dangerous.” 174
A court determines a person is sexually dangerous by finding: (1) the
person “has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or
child molestation”; and (2) the person “is sexually dangerous to others.”175
Unlike federal civil forfeiture statutes, federal civil commitment statutes
require a court to find these things by clear and convincing evidence.176
This standard of proof requirement codifies the Supreme Court’s prior
ruling in Addington v. Texas177 that the clear and convincing evidence
standard comports with the “due process guarantees” of the United States
Constitution.178 Civil commitment in the United States expanded over time
to include sexually dangerous persons, but retained the same rationale
used to justify a more limited historical practice.179 While the Court
accepted this expansion, it also required a higher standard of proof than
exists in a run-of-the-mill civil action.180 Likewise, as civil asset forfeiture
continues to expand beyond its historical roots, it too warrants a
reexamination of the appropriate evidentiary burden.

171. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 141 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (2006)).
172. See supra Section I.A.1.
173. See, e.g., Comstock, 560 U.S. at 137–38; cf. supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2012); Comstock, 560 U.S. at 141.
175. § 4247(a)(5)–(6) (“[A person is sexually dangerous to others when] the
person suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of
which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or
child molestation if released.”).
176. § 4248(d).
177. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
178. Id. at 433; see also Comstock, 560 U.S. at 132–33 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 4248 as
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause, but not considering an argument
that the clear and convincing standard violated procedural due process).
179. See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text.
180. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
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C. The Clear and Convincing Evidentiary Standard of Proof
An evidentiary standard evinces a commitment to due process, for by
allocating risk of error between litigants it requires different burdens of
proof based on what one may lose in a judicial proceeding.181 The
standard of proof creates a continuum of risk with the most risk allocated
to litigants at one end, and with the least risk to the litigants at the other
end. 182 The reasonable doubt standard exists only in criminal cases
because the specter of a conviction places immense risk on the
defendant.183 The possibility that a defendant “may lose his liberty upon
conviction,” as well as the stigmatic effect a conviction has on the
convicted, weighs heavily in favor of the most stringent evidentiary
standard. 184 At the other end of the spectrum, disputes that do not
place a litigant’s freedom in jeopardy and merely pose the risk of
financial loss require only the preponderance of the evidence standard. 185
The preponderance standard exists in cases where “society has a minimal
concern with the outcome” of the case.186 The Supreme Court has found
that the preponderance standard is acceptable even in cases where
“severe civil sanctions” are possible.187
The clear and convincing standard is the intermediate standard required
“where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.”188
181. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
182. See id. at 423–24 (explaining that the preponderance of the evidence standard
is at one end of the spectrum (most risk to litigants), while the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is at the other end of the spectrum (least risk to defendant)).
183. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–66 (1970) (holding that “civil labels and good
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards”
because the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction under a lesser
burden of proof).
184. Id. at 363–64.
185. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
186. Id.; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards
of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 251 (2002) (the preponderance of the evidence
standard “translates into more-likely-than-not . . . [and] is the usual standard in civil
litigation”).
187. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389–90 (1983); see also United
States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47–48 (1914) (“[I]n civil actions it is the duty of the jury
to resolve the issues of fact according to a reasonable preponderance of the evidence,
and this although they may involve a penalized or criminal act.”).
188. Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 389; see Clermont & Sherwin, supra, note 186,
at 251 (the clear and convincing standard is “roughly translated as much-more-likelythan-not” and it “applies in special situations, such as when terminating parental
rights”); see also RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 107 (2004) (arguing that due process requires a
heightened clear and convincing “standard of proof when the liberty interest at stake
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Courts consistently apply the standard in “civil cases involving allegations
of . . . quasi-criminal wrongdoing” or to “protect particularly important
individual interests in various civil cases.”189 The Supreme Court has held
that the intermediate clear and convincing evidence standard applies when
more is at stake than the mere loss of money.190 The Supreme Court
reasoned that in those instances, a court should use a “higher degree of
proof than applies in a negligence case.”191 Generally, the possibility of
individual injury must be “significantly greater than any possible harm to
the state.”192 For example, the Supreme Court held that the heightened
clear and convincing standard applies when terminating parental rights,
but not in a suit for paternity. 193
The standard of proof in a civil case represents an important concept
embodied in the Due Process Clause.194 To determine whether a given
standard of proof comports with procedural due process, the Court applies
a three-part inquiry articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.195 In Mathews, a state
agency terminated a disabled man’s Social Security disability (SSD) payments
administratively without providing him with an evidentiary hearing.196 The
plaintiff challenged the constitutional validity of the agency’s use of
administrative procedures, rather than holding a hearing, to determine
whether he was still disabled and eligible for benefits.197 In finding that
is significant, a majority of states apply a heightened standard of proof in the given
context, the issues to be decided are factual in nature, and the state itself is a litigant”).
189. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
190. Id.
191. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
192. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
193. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 575 (1987) (holding that “applying the
preponderance standard to [a paternity] determination is constitutionally permissible”);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–70 (1982) (holding “that a ‘clear and convincing
evidence’ standard of proof strikes a fair balance between the rights of the natural
parents and the State’s legitimate concerns”); see also WASSERMAN, supra note 188, at
106 (noting that the Rivera Court refused to extend Santosky to paternity suits because
the government was not a party in paternity cases, the “putative father’s interest in
avoiding financial responsibility for another man’s child and the mother’s interest in holding
the father financially responsible” are equal interests that warrant an equal distribution of risk,
and a majority of states applied the preponderance standard in paternity suits).
194. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 176 (2019) (explaining two reasons why requiring
the government to meet the standard of proof in an action against an individual
coheres with due process: (1) the government’s required burden demonstrates the
significance of the adjudication, and (2) the higher the burden of proof, the more risk
the individual faces with an adverse judgment).
195. 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
196. Id. at 323–25.
197. Id. at 324–25.
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an evidentiary hearing was not required, the Court evaluated three factors:
(1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of private
interest deprivation in the procedures used; and (3) the government’s
interest in the official action.198 While Mathews dealt with administrative
procedures, the Court has since applied the test in both the civil
commitment and civil asset forfeiture contexts.199
In Addington, the Court applied the Mathews test to determine that the
use of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard was necessary to
satisfy due process in civil commitment cases. 200 In Addington, police
arrested a mentally ill man for threatening to assault his mother. 201
After his mother filed a petition for the man’s indefinite commitment,
a Texas jury determined the man was mentally ill and recommended that
he go to a state hospital for an indefinite period for his own and others’
welfare.202 The Supreme Court examined the Mathews factors to evaluate the
appropriate standard of proof required in the commitment proceeding.203
Likewise, in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 204 the Court
used the Mathews factors in a civil forfeiture case where a Hawaii man
was sentenced to jail time and probation for violating Hawaii drug
laws. 205 Four years after the drugs were found, the Federal government
filed an in rem action against the man’s house and four-acre parcel of
land and seized both without notice or a hearing.206 After analyzing the
Mathews factors, the Court found that the Due Process Clause required
notice and a hearing before property can be seized.207 The Court
emphasized the importance of the private interests at stake to find that there
was no justification for holding the hearing after the property was seized.208
The Court’s prior use of the Mathews factors to analyze whether civil
forfeiture actions comport with the Due Process Clause, and the Court’s use
198. Id. at 334–35.
199. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53, 62 (1993)
(applying the Mathews balancing test to find that the civil forfeiture proceedings
require notice and a hearing); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 431–33 (1979)
(applying the Mathews balancing test to find that a preponderance of the evidence
standard in civil commitment proceedings was unconstitutional).
200. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.
201. Id. at 420.
202. Id. at 420–21.
203. Id. at 425.
204. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
205. Id. at 46, 53.
206. Id. at 46.
207. Id. at 62.
208. Id.
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of the Mathews factors to consider the constitutionality of an evidentiary
standard of proof, confirms the appropriateness of the use of those factors to
determine what standard must be used in civil forfeiture actions.209
II. ANALYSIS
This Comment argues that the current preponderance evidentiary
standard of proof used in civil asset forfeiture actions does not satisfy due
process. Using the three-factor Mathews balancing test, this Section argues
that the Constitution only permits a heightened clear and convincing
standard of proof. An individual’s interest in maintaining access to private
property balanced against the state’s interest in fighting crime and
punishing those who benefit from illegal activity with a mind toward the
great risk of erroneous deprivation clearly leads to the conclusion that civil
in rem forfeiture actions require a clear and convincing standard of proof.
First, private property rights are fundamental to the functioning of a
society.210 While civil in rem forfeiture puts all types of private property at
risk, its most serious implication is the deprivation of one’s home. 211 The
home is at the core of an individual’s private property portfolio and
accounts for a large percentage of an individual’s total wealth. 212 The
Supreme Court considers the home to be a constitutionally-protected,

209. See infra Part II.
210. See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795) (“[T]he right
of acquiring and possessing property . . . is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights of man. . . . Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their
natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them to unite in
society.”); III ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 862 (Edwin Cannan, ed., 1937) (1791) (“Commerce and manufactures can
seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of
justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their
property.”).
211. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/4EZA-JNJQ] (documenting
the forfeiture of an indigent elderly couple’s home after their adult son “allegedly sold twenty
dollars’ worth of marijuana to a confidential informant, on the porch of his parents’ home”).
212. See Michael Neal, Homeownership Remains a Key Component of Household Wealth,
NAT’L ASS’N HOME BUILDERS (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.nahbclassic.org/
generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=215073 (explaining that in 2010,
ownership of a primary residence accounted for nearly one-third of national
household assets and that more households owned a home than had a retirement
account).
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near-sacred location. 213 When the Court abandoned the historical
fiction that guilty property should be subject to civil forfeiture actions,
it imputed a negligent owner rationale to forfeiture proceedings that
rendered the civil forfeiture actions quasi-criminal in nature and
ultimately with a punitive goal. 214 Thus, the loss of one’s home in a civil
in rem forfeiture action is meant to punish the negligent homeowner. 215
That punishment, the loss of a home, is not unlike the loss of liberty in
that it carries with it a serious financial deprivation and a stigma that is
not easily shaken. 216 A home is an extension of one’s self that serves as an
entrée into a community or society at-large, a place to host family and
friends, and an individual’s largest asset.217 The loss of that home carries
with it a stigmatic effect that could forfeit one’s most intimate
relationships or the ability to participate in a community. 218 While the
loss of one’s home is not the only property implicated in civil in rem
forfeiture actions, the fact that it does occur weighs strongly in favor of
a heightened evidentiary standard for the practice at large. The
individual has a great interest in maintaining his property against
punitive action unless the state can prove wrongdoing by at least a clear
and convincing standard of proof. 219
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of property heightens with a
lesser standard of proof. 220 This risk is not equally allocated between the
government and the individual because the government carries the entire
benefit of gaining title to property which funds government activities,
while the individual loses items of immense value and potentially great
personal significance.221 Finally, the government’s interest in preventing
213. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (noting that “overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic”).
214. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
216. Cf. Robert J. Shiller, The Scars of Losing a Home, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at
BU5 (noting in the home foreclosure context that “there is deep trauma” in the loss
of a home because “homeownership is [a] fundamental part of a sense of belonging
to a country” and the home itself is “an extension of self”).
217. See 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291–92 (1890) (explaining
that the home is a part of oneself because “[i]ts scenes are a part of our life” and “a man’s
Self [sic] is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers,
but his clothes and his house . . . his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account”).
218. See id. at 292–93.
219. See infra Section II.A.
220. See infra Section II.A.
221. See CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 10–11 (noting that deposits into the
Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund grew by 4667 percent from 1986 to 2014 and
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crime—and in punishing those who benefit financially from it—is simply
not enough to distribute the risk evenly. A heightened evidentiary standard
would not unnecessarily stifle law enforcement goals. The heightened
standard would merely protect the individual against the erroneous
deprivation that has become the object of popular ridicule. 222
A. The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test Renders the Preponderance
Evidentiary Standard in Civil In Rem Forfeiture Proceedings
Unconstitutional
Civil in rem forfeiture, like civil commitment, requires an evidentiary
standard of proof higher than mere preponderance of the evidence. This
section applies the three Mathews factors, as applied to civil commitment
proceedings in Addington, to argue that the use of the lower preponderance
standard violates the Due Process Clause.223 Applying the Mathews
balancing test to the current civil in rem forfeiture preponderance standard
clearly demonstrates that the lower standard is unconstitutional.224 The
Mathews balancing test provides a due process-based framework to
challenge state procedures that deprived a party of an interest. 225 The
first Mathews factor requires a court to consider the extent to which the
official action will affect the private party’s interest. 226 When the
Supreme Court previously used the Mathews framework to analyze a
federal forfeiture proceeding in the seizure of a home following a state
criminal conviction, the Court found that the first factor, the
individual’s private interest in the property subject to forfeiture, weighed

accounted for $4.5 billion). State-level data is difficult to obtain, but presents the opportunity
for “police and prosecutors [to] self-fund, [thus going] entirely beyond the democratic
controls embodied by city councils, county commissions and state legislatures.” Id.
222. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B.
223. See infra Section II.A.
224. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2012) (“In a suit or action brought under any civil
forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property—(1) the burden of proof is on
the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is
subject to forfeiture.”).
225. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1979) (applying the Mathews factors to
determine that Georgia’s commitment procedures for minor children did not violate
due process).
226. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–56 (1993) (applying the first Mathews factor to find
a civil forfeiture proceeding against a home required notice and a hearing to comport
with the Due Process Clause’s requirements); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425
(1979) (applying the first Mathews factor to civil commitment to “assess . . . the extent
of the individual’s interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely”).
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heavily in the Mathews analysis.227 The Court found that an individual has
a significant and historic private interest “to maintain control over [a]
home, and to be free from governmental interference,” and the same
applies “to real property in general, not simply residences.”228 Thus, when
the government seizes property, like its seizure of an individual through civil
commitment, it creates a “significant deprivation” that requires due process
protection.229 The Addington Court found that civil commitment also had
the real potential to “engender adverse social consequences to the
individual.”230 The Court has similarly acknowledged that the owner of
forfeited property “feels the pain and receives the stigma of the forfeiture.”231
The substantial private interests at stake in a civil in rem forfeiture
proceeding weigh the first Mathews factor in favor of a higher evidentiary
standard of proof because civil forfeiture is a quasi-criminal proceeding
that results in more than a mere loss of money. First, the quasi-criminal
nature of civil asset forfeiture suggests an evidentiary standard higher
than mere preponderance.232 In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, the Supreme
Court held that a forfeiture proceeding was quasi-criminal in character. 233
Similarly, the Court in Austin confirmed that civil forfeiture was historically
understood as punishment with a penal purpose and remedial character.234
Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation confirms that it uses asset
forfeiture “[t]o punish criminals [and t]o deter illegal activity.”235 Former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions further confirmed this quasi-criminal
character when he stated that “civil asset forfeiture is a key tool that helps
227. James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 54–55.
228. Id. at 53–54, 61.
229. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (repeating axiomatically that civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty requiring due process
protection).
230. Id. at 426 (stopping short of labeling those consequences as stigma but
recognizing that civil commitment “can have a very significant impact on the
individual”); cf. supra note 211 and accompanying text.
231. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 295 (1996) (asserting that stigma and
pain exist in the context of reaffirming the Court’s condemnation of the legal fiction
of guilty property).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 84–89.
233. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
234. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993); see also Timbs v. Indiana,
139 S. Ct. 682, 687, 690 (2019) (unanimously declining “to reconsider [the Court’s]
unanimous judgment in Austin that civil in rem forfeitures are fines for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment when they are at least partially punitive”). The Court held that the “Excessive Fines
Clause is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
235. What We Investigate: Asset Forfeiture, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.
fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc /7ULQ-MWJW].
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law enforcement defund organized crime, take back ill-gotten gains, and
prevent new crimes from being committed, and it weakens the criminals
and the cartels.”236 Sessions announced the purpose of civil asset
forfeiture in the context of his decision to reverse an Obama-era directive
that suspended a Department of Justice Equitable Sharing Program that
adopted property seized by localities.237 Sessions announced that the
Department would now adopt seized property if “the state or local agency
involved provides information demonstrating that the seizure was justified
by probable cause.”238 Notably, Sessions directed “Department attorneys
to proceed with an abundance of caution when handling all forfeitures
involving vehicles and especially residences.”239 This directive acknowledges
the important interests at stake in civil in rem forfeiture actions.240

236. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Attorney General Sessions Issues Policy and Guidelines on
Federal Adoptions of Assets Seized by State or Local Law Enforcement (July 19, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-issues-policy-and-guidelinesfederal-adoptions-assets-seized-state [https://perma.cc/PC5J-75QG] [hereinafter
Sessions Press Release]. But cf. Nick Sibilla, Congress Killed Efforts to Undo Sessions’s Civil
Forfeiture Expansion, Despite Unanimous House Votes, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2018, 12:10 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2018/04/02/congress-killedefforts-to-undo-sessionss-civil-forfeiture-expansion-despite-unanimous-house-votes
[https://perma.cc/W32A-JY7A] (opining that Sessions’s civil forfeiture changes
brought a “brief moment of bipartisan unity” that saw no opposition to amendments
that would curtail Sessions’s reversal of “a 2015 policy by then-Attorney General Eric
Holder that placed strict limits on so-called ‘adoptive’ forfeitures”). “Adoptive”
forfeitures allow state agencies to confiscate valuable property and transfer it to federal
agencies who “adopt” it to pursue federal forfeiture actions. Id.
237. Matt Ford, The Bipartisan Opposition to Sessions’s New Civil-Forfeiture Rules,
ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/
sessions-forfeiture-justice-department-civil/534168 [https://perma.cc/7MUV-8NF5].
238. Sessions Press Release, supra note 236.
239. Sessions Press Release, supra note 236. But see Letter from Mike Lee et al., United
States Senators, to Jeff Sessions, Attorney General of the United States (May 31, 2017),
https://www.scribd.com/document/349961824/Letter-to-AG-Sessions-Calling-forCivil-Asset-Forfeiture-Reform [https://perma.cc/3XGY-PTN3] (observing bipartisan
concern about the government’s civil asset forfeiture practices). The Senators’ letter
reiterated Justice Clarence Thomas’s skepticism “that civil asset forfeiture practices are
constitutional” should mandate that “the Department of Justice . . . err on the side of
protecting constitutional rights . . . [and] revise its civil asset forfeiture practices to reflect
our nation’s commitment to the rule of law and due process.” Letter from Mike Lee, supra.
240. See Sessions Press Release, supra note 236 (recognizing “that Department
attorneys should think hard before they agree to forfeit these types of property, or
waive any asset thresholds associated with them” and that “protecting the rights of
property owners” was a valid objective).
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Second, a forfeiture action often results in deprivations “more substantial
than mere loss of money.”241 As the most egregious examples of abuse in the
media illustrate, forfeiture actions often reach the home or personal
possessions in addition to mere money.242 The home occupies a near-sacred
status in the Court’s jurisprudence that places it far above a simple loss of
money in a run-of-the-mill civil action. 243 Depriving property under a
quasi-criminal statutory regime implicates a serious enough private
interest—the loss of property and financial stability—to weigh the first
Mathews factor in favor of a higher evidentiary standard.244
The second Mathews factor requires a court to weigh “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of [the private] interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards.”245 In civil forfeiture proceedings, the individual risks being
erroneously deprived of his or her property.246 The entire legal process
functions generally “to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions;” however,
the standard of proof is instrumental in preventing erroneous decisions
within the legal process because it “serves to allocate the risk of error
between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to
the ultimate decision.”247 The loss of liberty associated with an erroneous
commitment presented the Supreme Court with too great a risk under the
preponderance standard and thus a higher allocation of the risk to the

241. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (stating that the intermediate
clear and convincing standard applies in civil cases “involving allegations of fraud or
some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant”). The substantial loss
associated with those cases necessitates courts “accordingly reduc[ing] the risk to the
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s
burden of proof.” Id.
242. See, e.g., supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Stillman, supra note 211
(documenting many instances of civil in rem forfeiture abuse and noting that the
“system that proved successful at wringing profits from drug cartels and white-collar
fraudsters has also given rise to corruption and violations of civil liberties”).
243. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993)
(describing the significant and historic private interest that exists in “maintain[ing]
control over [a] home”); see, e.g., Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy:
Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 957
(1997) (“The most sacred of all areas protected by the Fourth Amendment is the home.”).
244. Cf. Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 941 (Wyo. 2000) (finding the presence of
“allegations of quasi-criminal wrongdoing” in a proceeding against a medical licensee
supported the use of a clear and convincing standard of proof).
245. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
246. See James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 55.
247. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 425 (1979).
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government was required.248 Likewise, in James Daniel, the Court found that
the seizure proceedings created an unacceptable risk of innocent
deprivation.249 While Congress codified an innocent owner defense and
allocated the burden of proof to the government in CAFRA, the
preponderance standard still allocates the risk equally to the government
and the individual and does not adequately protect against erroneous
deprivation.250 This equal allocation of risk does not reflect the reality of
the two parties in a civil in rem forfeiture action. Federal law enforcement
agencies have resources and power that an individual citizen cannot hope
to match.251 The government risks little by bringing a civil in rem forfeiture
action.252 If the government wins, it gets new equipment or funding for a
new program, in addition to any indirect punishment of criminal activity,
while the individual potentially loses an item of great worth like an
automobile, a home, or cash. 253 Even in instances where property owners
prevail in court and regain their property, they still lose time and

248. Id. at 427.
249. James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 55 (highlighting the unacceptable risk in the context
of an ex parte drug seizure and finding that “[a]lthough Congress designed the drug
forfeiture statute to be a powerful instrument in enforcement of the drug laws, it did
not intend to deprive innocent owners of their property,” thus due process required
notice and a hearing).
250. See supra notes 103, 107–11 and accompanying text.
251. Compare FBI Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2019: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Justice, Sci., and Related Agencies of the S. Appropriations Comm., 115th Cong.
(May 16, 2018) (statement of Dir. Christopher Wray, Fed. Bureau of Investigation)
(requesting a “total of $8.92 billion in direct budget authority to carry out the FBI’s
national security, criminal law enforcement, and criminal justice services missions”
which included funding for “12,927 special agents, 3,055 intelligence analysts, and 18,712
professional staff”), with Camilo Maldonado, Is Your Net Worth Higher than Average?, FORBES (Aug.
15, 2018, 9:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/camilo maldonado/2018/08/15/is-yournet-worth-higher-than-average [https://perma.cc/AE2T-V7M5] (underscoring that “[t]he
most recent census data shows a median household net worth of $80,039” but without
real estate “the number drops to $25,116”).
252. See, e.g., What We Investigate: Asset Forfeiture, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/asset-forfeiture
[https://perma.cc/C4KY-Y63Q] (asserting that “[a]ll across the country, forfeited
funds are being used to help protect and serve our communities and support law
enforcement”).
253. See, e.g., United States v. $28,000.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 10CV2378–LAB
(CAB), 2013 WL 525648, at *1, *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2013), vacated and remanded, 802
F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2015) (awarding only $14,000 in attorney’s fees to a claimant who
“successfully obtained return of the Defendant currency, and moved pursuant to the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) for attorney’s fees of over $50,000”).
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money.254 Neither the allocation of power between the parties nor the
allocation of risk are equally balanced in a federal civil in rem forfeiture
action, so it follows that the evidentiary standard of proof should likewise
not balance risk between the parties. Neither the innocent owner defense
nor the allocation of the initial burden of proof in a civil in rem forfeiture
proceeding is enough to counter-balance the significant risk of deprivation.
Indeed, in the two decades since Congress enacted CAFRA, examples of
unjust and erroneous deprivations remain legion with increasing
denunciation coming from all sides of the political spectrum.255
The third Mathews factor requires a court to weigh “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”256 The Addington Court defined the third factor as “the state’s
interest in committing the emotionally disturbed under a particular
standard of proof.”257 Similarly, the James Daniel Court framed the analysis
as a consideration of the government’s specific interest related to the
forfeiture proceeding at issue and not a consideration of “some general
interest in forfeiting property.”258 The Addington Court confirmed that the
state has two legitimate interests in civil commitment—the parens patriae
power and the police power—that justify the practice in general. 259
However, those powers do not justify the use of a preponderance
standard.260 Similarly, the Supreme Court noted that there are three
legitimate government interests in civil forfeiture; however, only two of those
interests are relevant to the discussion of civil in rem forfeiture.261 First, the
government has a legitimate pecuniary interest in “recovering all forfeitable
254. See United States v. $28,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 802 F.3d 1100, 1103–04 (9th
Cir. 2015) (stating that the claimant retained “an experienced forfeiture specialist to
oppose the government’s claim and assert [his] ownership of the [forfeited] funds”
under a fee agreement that required the claimant to pay his attorney “the greater of
one third of recovery or any statutory fee award”).
255. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 211.
256. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
257. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
258. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S.43, 56 (1993).
259. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
260. Id.
261. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629–30 (1989) (documenting
the three government interests as: first, a “pecuniary interest in forfeiture” that seeks to
recover “all forfeitable assets” and deposit them “in a Fund that supports lawenforcement efforts in a variety of important and useful ways;” second, a “restitutionary
[sic]” interest to “return[] property, in full, to those wrongfully deprived or defrauded
of it;” third, an interest in “lessen[ing] the economic power of organized crime and
drug enterprises”).
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assets” and “using the profits of crime to fund” important law enforcement
activities.262 Second, the Government has an interest in lessening the “the
economic power of organized crime and drug enterprises.”263 The second
justification falls within the same police power cited by the Addington
Court.264 However, while affirming the existence of the government’s police
power as the basis for commitment, the Addington Court simultaneously
affirmed that this legitimate interest does not provide legitimacy to the
erroneous commitment of those who are not mentally ill.265 Likewise, the
State has no legitimate interest in the forfeiture of innocent property, as the
codification of an innocent owner defense in CAFRA demonstrates.266
After balancing the three Mathews factors, the preponderance of the
evidence standard does not pass constitutional muster under the Due Process
Clause and must be abandoned.267 On the one hand, the Court must
balance the individual’s historic and fundamental interest in property268 with
the possibility that the lowered preponderance standard would result in an
erroneous deprivation.269 On the other hand, the Court must acknowledge
262. Id. at 629; see What We Investigate: Asset Forfeiture, supra note 252 (outlining that
“forfeited funds are being used to help protect and serve our communities and support
law enforcement” including financing gun buy-back programs and paying for a
“plaque for a law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty”). But see Diane
Jennings, Lawmakers Eye Reforms for Texas Asset Forfeitures, DALL. NEWS (Feb. 2011),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2011/02/28/lawmakers-eye-reforms-fortexas-asset-forfeitures [https://perma.cc/TGS9-L2LC] (demonstrating that local
Texas law enforcement used the proceeds of forfeited property to buy “trips to
casinos,” bonuses paid to staff, and “tequila, rum, kegs and a margarita machine for
an employee party”).
263. Id. at 630.
264. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686–87 (1974)
(establishing that forfeiture has “punitive and deterrent purposes” and that it “impos[es]
an economic penalty [that] render[s] illegal behavior unprofitable”).
265. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
266. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012); supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) (highlighting
an “affirmative defense of innocent ownership” contained in “the drug forfeiture statute”
meant that Congress “did not intend to deprive innocent owners of their property”).
267. Cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431 (concluding “that the preponderance standard
falls short of meeting the demands of due process” in the civil commitment context).
268. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *138 (“The third absolute right,
inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free use,
enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save
only by the laws of the land.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (stating that
“rights of property originate” from “[t]he diversity in the faculties of men,” and that
“[t]he protection of these faculties is the first object of government”).
269. See CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 6 (concluding that both federal laws “and most
state civil forfeiture laws put innocent property owners at risk”).
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the state’s interest in preventing ill-gotten property from remaining in public
hands, in gaining funds from illegal activity to help law enforcement, and in
deterring would-be criminals from engaging in illicit activity.270 The risk of
the erroneous deprivation of property, including a home or assets by
which an individual makes a living, is too great under the equal allocation
of risk represented by the preponderance standard. As the Court found in
civil commitment, so should it find in civil in rem forfeiture. They are
analogous procedures that deprive individuals of liberty and property; both
require a higher evidentiary standard to satisfy procedural due process.271
B. The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test Requires the Clear and
Convincing Evidentiary Standard in Civil In Rem Forfeiture Proceedings
This section argues that the clear and convincing standard satisfies the Due
Process Clause. Even though civil in rem forfeiture without an underlying
criminal conviction is arguably a criminal procedure with fewer inherent
procedural protections than civil commitment, the highest evidentiary
standard, beyond a reasonable doubt, is not required.272
Since applying the preponderance of the evidence standard is
unconstitutional in civil in rem forfeiture cases, it is necessary to examine
the two remaining evidentiary standards of proof: reasonable doubt and
clear and convincing evidence. While undoubtedly convincing arguments
exist that civil in rem forfeiture is a de facto criminal process,273 the Supreme
Court has rejected them.274 The Court’s selective application of criminal
270. See supra notes 261–64 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 229–31 and accompanying text.
272. See Lilienthal’s Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 271 (1878) (holding that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in civil in rem forfeiture cases in part
because actions “against property differ widely from an action against the person to
recover a penalty imposed to punish the offender”).
273. See, e.g., Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset
Forfeiture as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2396–97 (2018)
(arguing that modern “practices have morphed civil forfeiture into a creature of
criminal law and resultantly a punitive rather than remedial instrument”). The Note
explains that because the Supreme Court “has deviated from its historical nonpenal
justification for in rem forfeitures,” law enforcement employs “criminal law
enforcement tactics for civil forfeiture purposes, advancing the aims of criminal
punishment.” Id. at 2396. Statutes that allow in rem forfeiture “are punitive based on
the Supreme Court’s criteria for determining when a statute is punitive.” Id. Should
the Court apply this logic, one implication would be added strength to an argument
that the reasonable doubt standard should apply in these cases.
274. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J.
2446, 2491 (2016) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270–71 (1996))
(explaining that “the Court announced a not-quite-categorical rule[] in United States
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constitutional protections insufficiently supports the argument that all civil in
rem forfeitures are de facto criminal proceedings. Indeed, the Court explicitly
ruled in Lilienthal’s Tobacco v. United States275 that due process did not require
the reasonable doubt standard in a civil forfeiture case.276 Just eight years
later, in Boyd, the Court cast doubt upon its prior declarations277 that civil
asset forfeiture was a civil rather than a criminal action.278 The Boyd ruling
applied only to property forfeited “by reason of offences [sic] committed”
by an individual, which seems to preclude application of the holding to
civil in rem forfeiture actions with no underlying conviction.279
Since Boyd, the Supreme Court continues to apply constitutional
protections to civil forfeiture proceedings in a manner that draws
distinctions between provisions that are and are not limited to criminal
proceedings.280 There remains a tension281 between Boyd’s holding and the
Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Zucker,282 which found that
civil forfeiture proceedings require no Sixth Amendment protections.283
The Court attempts to distinguish its position in Zucker with that in Boyd by
declaring that the Sixth Amendment applies only to “a prosecution of
an accused person which is technically criminal in its nature.” 284 The
implication is that the “quasi-criminal” case from Boyd is not technically
criminal enough. 285 Additionally, the Court held that the Fourth
v. Ursery, a case involving the extensive forfeiture provisions in modern drug and
money-laundering statutes, the Court held that ‘these civil forfeitures (and civil
forfeitures generally) . . . do not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause’”).
275. 97 U.S. 237, 237 (1878).
276. Id. at 271–72 (focusing on the distinction between criminal and civil cases to
hold that the same reasonable doubt level of proof is not required in both, but not
deciding what standard of proof is appropriate in a forfeiture case).
277. See, e.g., United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796)
(holding unanimously that the forfeiture of a vessel illegally transporting arms was “a
civil cause . . . of a libel in rem; and does not, in any degree, touch the person of the
offender”).
278. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–34 (1886) (holding “that proceedings
instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences
[sic] committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal”).
279. Id.; see Nelson, supra note 274, at 2488.
280. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 n.4 (1993).
281. Nelson, supra note 274, at 2488–89 (stating that “the Supreme Court unsettled”
the “well-settled” principle articulated in Boyd “just four years later” and noting that the
“tension between Boyd and Zucker has carried forward into more recent [forfeiture] cases”).
282. 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
283. Id. at 481.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
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Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture, 286 as does the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment; 287 however, the
Eighth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause does not. 288 The Court
prefers a case-by-case analysis rather than a general pronouncement
that all civil in rem forfeiture actions are criminal. 289
Likewise, for civil commitment, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
reasonable doubt standard in Addington and, in 2010, refused to reconsider
whether civil commitment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.290 If
the Court has previously ruled, and recently refused to reconsider, that the
deprivation of liberty associated with civil commitment does not rise to the
level of the reasonable doubt evidentiary standard, the deprivation of
property associated with civil in rem forfeiture could not convincingly fit
within the Court’s jurisprudence as requiring reasonable doubt.291
With the reasonable doubt standard eliminated, the only remaining
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.292 The Supreme
Court’s rationale for the application of the clear and convincing standard
to civil commitment applies to the discussion of the same standard for
civil in rem forfeiture.293 The Court has repeated that a “forfeiture
proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal
proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the
law.”294 The quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture justifies the use of the
286. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965).
287. See United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971).
288. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270 (1996).
289. See, e.g., id. at 277–78 (applying a two-part inquiry to determine whether the
forfeiture at issue was “criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial” (quoting United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984))).
290. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 132 (2010) (addressing only the
question of “whether the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . grants Congress authority”
for civil commitment of sexual offenders, but “not decid[ing] that other provisions of
the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment”);
see also United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) (finding that the “Supreme Court has never
retreated from” the holding that “proof by clear and convincing evidence sufficed to
justify commitment of the mentally ill”).
291. One could argue that civil in rem forfeiture with no underlying conviction is
more egregious than civil commitment. With civil commitment, the statute requires
an underlying conviction, whereas in the forfeiture context there has been no
conviction. Property deprivations in civil in rem forfeiture cases occur without any prior
procedures conferring additional due process safeguards.
292. See supra, notes 181–91 and accompanying text.
293. See supra Section II.A.
294. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965); see also
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co.
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clear and convincing standard because the intermediate standard is
meant for “civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasicriminal wrongdoing.”295 Additionally, the Court has held that the state’s
efforts to civilly confine someone advances a non-punitive governmental
objective that places it outside the realm of a criminal punishment.296
Additional justification for the application of the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard comes from an examination of areas of law, other
than civil commitment, to which the standard applies. The Supreme
Court has held that revoking a naturalization decree is so important to the
liberty of the citizen that a clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidentiary
standard must apply.297 Additionally, the Court required a clear and
convincing standard in a dispute between the states of Colorado and New
Mexico about the diversion of a river.298 The Court reasoned the application
of the clear and convincing standard was appropriate because diverting
interstate water was not an ordinary civil case.299 As it would in civil in rem
forfeiture cases, the clear and convincing standard in the water diversion case
“accommodate[d] society’s competing interests in increasing the stability of
property rights and in putting resources to their most efficient uses.”300
The Supreme Court’s designation of civil in rem forfeiture and civil
commitment as quasi-criminal proceedings render them both outside the
protection of the most stringent evidentiary standard: proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The use of the intermediate clear and convincing
evidentiary standard is necessary for quasi-criminal proceedings. Indeed,
the Court’s application of the intermediate standard to naturalization
proceedings and land disputes between states only bolsters the argument
that the clear and convincing evidence is constitutionally required in civil
in rem forfeiture cases.

v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)) (concluding that forfeiture cases are “too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced”); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 354 (1984)
(holding that civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause).
295. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
296. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997).
297. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (quoting Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943)).
298. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 312–13 (1984).
299. Id. at 316.
300. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Finding the clear and convincing standard necessary to satisfy due process
in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings will not cure all the ills or abuses
associated with civil asset forfeiture; indeed, that would likely require even
greater reform in Congress and state legislatures.301 However, a heightened
standard of proof would comport with due process and bring consistency to
analogous civil procedures—civil commitment and civil in rem forfeiture.
Balancing the Mathews factors in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Addington renders a heightened evidentiary standard of proof necessary to
comport with constitutional due process requirements.
Civil in rem forfeiture is a powerful law enforcement tool used to
advance the noble purpose of fighting crime by strangling the finances of
often evil criminal enterprises. This noble goal conflicts with an
individual’s interest in keeping legitimate property, notably the home.
Until the late twentieth century, civil forfeiture allowed removing
contraband from the streets and confiscating property that facilitated illegal
activity. A ship used to smuggle tea that had not paid customs duties or a car
used to transport illegal liquor could be forfeited because it was used to
commit a crime. While the initial guilty property rationale faded, the
negligent owner theory perpetuated this limited use of forfeiture on
contraband and facilitating property. However, as wealthy criminal
enterprises became more prevalent, the federal government expanded
forfeiture to cut off revenue sources. Once forfeiture expanded to the
proceeds of criminality, the use of civil in rem forfeiture ballooned and
created a financial dependency that remains a strong incentive for the
government to pursue forfeiture actions. Forfeiture became a strategy
necessary for the bottom line as well as for the removal of criminality
from the streets.
This history resulted in the CAFRA reform effort, including the
preponderance standard of proof; however, that standard does not
comport with the Due Process Clause. The Mathews balancing test, as
applied to the civil commitment standard of proof in Addington, leads to the
inescapable conclusion that civil forfeiture likewise requires the heightened
clear and convincing evidentiary standard of proof.

301. See, e.g., Nick Sibilla, New Federal Legislation Would Drastically Overhaul Civil
Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://ij.org/press-release/new-federallegislation-drastically-overhaul-civil-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/2QAT-75HA] (outlining
the Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration Act of 2017).

